Workforce reduction and firm performance: Evidence from French firm data by Reynaud, Bénédicte
Workforce reduction and firm performance: Evidence
from French firm data
Be´ne´dicte Reynaud
To cite this version:
Be´ne´dicte Reynaud. Workforce reduction and firm performance: Evidence from French firm
data. PSE Working Papers n2010-05. 2010. <halshs-00564828>
HAL Id: halshs-00564828
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00564828
Submitted on 10 Feb 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 WORKING PAPER N° 2010 - 05 
 
 
 
Workforce reduction and firm performance: 
 
Evidence from French firm data 
 
 
 
 
Bénédicte Reynaud 
 
 
 
 
 JEL Codes: C14, D21, G14, J63, L25 
 Keywords: Worforce reduction, layoff, financial 
performance, return on equity, selection bias 
  
 
 
PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TÉL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00   –   FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA  RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE DES PONTS PARISTECH – ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE – INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE AGRONOMIQUE 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Workforce Reduction and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from French Firm Data 
Bénédicte Reynaud‡‡ 
 
February 1, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I wish to thank the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) for 
its technical and statistical support, which permitted this study. Thanks to Arnaud Degorre 
(INSEE), Sébastien Roux (INSEE), Anne Demartini (Autorité des Marchés financiers, AMF) for 
their helpful comments on datasets used in this research and Julien Grenet (EHESS-PSE) for 
his continuing help. We are grateful for thoughtful comments from Philippe Askenazy (CNRS-
PSE), Thomas Piketty (EHESS-PSE) and Muriel Roger (INRA-LEA-PSE) for valuable comments 
and suggestions. All caveats apply. 
                                                          
‡‡ Researcher at Paris School of Economics (PSE), Address: Paris School of Economics, 48 
Bd. Jourdan, 75014 Paris. France. E-mail: benedicte.reynaud@ens.fr 
Phone number: 33 (1) 43 13 62 52.  
Workforce Reduction and Firm Performance: Evidence from
French Firm Data
February 1, 2010
Abstract
Using a large annual data base of French firms (1994-2000), this article examines the
determinants of a workforce reduction of publicly-listed and non-listed companies and
their consequences on firm performance. Firstly, workforce reduction appears to be a de-
fensive response to an adverse economic shock. However, publicly-listed firms anticipate
better than the others the decision to cut jobs. Secondly, using a Difference in Differences
model, the estimates indicate that there has been a very small but significant improvement
in the major performance indicators of the non-listed companies. For listed-companies,
the estimates are no significant.
JEL classification: C14, D21, G14, J63, L25.
Keywords: Worforce Reduction, Layoff, Financial Performance, Return on Equity, Se-
lection Bias.
Word count: 6786 words including text and references.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we will use alternatively workforce reduction, downsizing or layoff. The reason
is that in France, there is no institutional difference between layoff and downsizing since a
layoff implies a permanent separation with workers.1 Although we are aware of the subtleties
of defining organizational downsizing, we adopt the notion commonly accepted by the scholars
Cascio 1993; Freeman& Cameron (1994: 12) and most of the academics, including DeWitt,
1998; De Meuse and al. 1994; Budros (1999: 70). They define downsizing as an intentional
policy involving a reduction in the workforce to improve the firm’s efficiency. As Cameron
(1994: 194) pointed out: "downsizing may be reactive and defensive, or it may be proactive
and anticipatory."
Baumol, Blinder & Wolff (2004: 5) pointed out the lack of empirical studies on the effects
on a workforce reduction on firm performance. Moreover, the few empirical studies highlight
their “conflicting findings” (Wayan & Wermer 2000: 343-344). Some papers conclude that
downsizing improves economic performance, reducing the labour costs. Others report either
equivocal outcomes or mixed results Cappelli and al. 1997; Baumol, Blinder & Wolff (2004:
194-197) or negative effects Cascio 1993: 100 ; Cameron 1994 ; Mishra & Spreitzer 1998. So,
it has not been clear whether downsizing does indeed improve economic performance. As a
result, firms either have a hazy idea of the consequences of downsizing or think that its impact
is generally negative.
1It is an important difference with the U.S. In a layoff the worker is asked to temporarily leave during
periods of weak demand, but will be asked back when business picks up. However as Cappelli (2000: 3)
pointed out layoff is associated with shortfalls in demand while downsizing consists of ’reductions in jobs
driven by the desire for operating efficiencies’.
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This paper adopts a complementary approach, focusing on the statistical methods that
have been underestimated. They may be another source of diversity of outcomes. In actual
fact, several statistical shortcomings undermine their reliability. Firstly, the choice of samples
in the previous studies are so limited in their size (the largest is the Standard and Poors
index) that no serious conclusions can be drawn. Secondly, in order to analyse the impact
of downsizing on firms’ performance, some papers compare the average profitability growth
between companies that have or have not reduced their workforce. They implicitly assume that
the consequences of a workforce reduction are not contingent upon the initial characteristics of
the firms that downsize. In so doing, these studies entail an important selection bias. Thirdly,
most of the research deals with big firms. They never draw the distinction between publicly
listed and non-listed companies. If we assume that workforce reduction policy lies in the
domain of corporate governance depending on the distribution of power between shareholders
and stockholders,then the causes of a workforce reduction and - as a consequence - the economic
performance of list and non-lited firms should be different.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous research on the economic
effects of a workforce reduction. Section 3 describes the database we built. Section 4 outlines
the econometric strategy. Section 5 analyses the determinants of workforce reduction in 1996,
the reference year chosen for this research. Section 6 is devoted to estimating the impact of
workforce reduction using a corrected Difference in Differences estimator. Some concluding
remarks are offered in section 7.
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2 The Economic Effects of a Workforce Reduction: A Review
of the Previous Research Findings
Baumol, Blinder and Wolff consider themselves as the "the first economists who study down-
sizing" Baumol, Blinder and Wolff (2004:5). For the manufacturing sector, they find that
downsizing has not contributed to productivity, contrary to others studies Baily, Bartelsman
and Haltiwanger 1996; Collins and Harris 1999; and our findings.
According to the managerial literature, firms downsize for two opposite reasons, each of which
has prevailed historically depending on the period concerned. First, in the 1980’s, downsiz-
ing was a common strategic response to save failing companies who were losing market share
to foreign firms, or suffering large falls in demand for their products Cameron & Whetten
1987; Freeman & Cameron 1993. However, the merger wave of the 1980’s influenced the eval-
uation of firms and, as a consequence the downsizing strategy. Any company trading at a
price-earnings multiple lower than the industry-wide multiple was viewed as undervalued or
a poor-performer, and ripe for takeover. Moreover, shareholders considered that CEOs and
executive management ought to be theirs servants. These above attitudes explain the change
in the meaning of downsizing that characterized a second period in the mid 1990’s. Urged by
financial markets to increase their return on equity, even though they already enjoyed strong
profits, large corporations embarked on internal restructuring, consisting in both reducing em-
ployment and taking financial actions such as selling non-performing assets or refocusing on
core activities. These two reasons corresponding to two business periods (the eighties and the
nineties) define two meanings of downsizing.
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On the conceptual side, Cameron, Freeman and Mishra (1993) have clearly defined an
offensive downsizing in three steps: (1) an intentional plan (2) which means a reduction in
company’s size, in terms of either its workforce or its assets (3) and whose purpose is mainly an
increase in profitability. So offensive downsizing appears as a well-prepared strategy developed
by the managers. 2
On the contrary, a defensive downsizing signals an effort to check or attenuate a decline in
profitability. Thus, layoffs are driven by changes in the product market and product demand,
and constitute a defensive response by firms to avoid bankruptcy. Cappelli (2000) accurately
sums-up these findings: the distinctiveness of an offensive downsizing, as opposed to a defen-
sive downsizing, is that the job cuts do not necessarily appear to be driven by shortfalls in
demand but are instead the consequence of a well-prepared management strategy.
On the empirical side, a first set of studies have examined the main predictors of downsiz-
ing. Budros (1999) outlined a general framework with both sociological and economic causes of
downsizing. The latter are classified into two categories: internal inefficiency (oversized firms)
or external pressures (shareholder value, deregulation). However, few studies have tried to
measure explicitly the importance of these factors. Based on a sample of 297 firms, González
and Vicente-Lorente (2000) concluded that for the period 1989-1994, defensive downsizing
occurred among the largest Spanish firms, with low productivity levels, financial difficulties,
and decreasing scale of activity. A second set of economic studies looks at the consequences
of downsizing. The seminal work comes from De Meuse et al. (1994), but their sample of 57
2It also the Cascio’s perspective. As it is explained at the beginning of his paper, Cascio (1993) asserted
that downsizing is essentially a purposive strategy defined as ’the planned eliminations of positions or jobs’
while Cameron (1994) stressed the positive impacts of downsizing on efficiency and productivity.
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companies is so small that their results are hardly significant. Cascio, Young and Morris (1997)
found some positive relationships between reduction in employment and financial performance.
Interestingly, companies that combine employment downsizing with asset restructuring gener-
ate a higher return on assets. Albeit still scarce, studies on French accounting data also tended
to suggest a positive outcome to restructuring. Using a sample of 90 large companies whose
workforce has been reduced by more than 10 percent, Sentis (1998) showed that indebtedness
decreased after a large workforce reduction. For d’Arcimoles and FakhFakh (1997), layoffs are
profitable as they affect not only the workforce level, but also its structure. However, there are
important statistical drawbacks to these previous estimates. The accounting standards used
are not always satisfactory for evaluating the change in economic performance. For instance,
one should compute the labour productivity per hour, not per capita, since the ratio of the
yearly flow of output on a final reduced stock of workers overestimates the change in labour
productivity.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical investigation is based on three data sets, providing us with labour, economic and
financial information on French companies over the period 1994-2000. Note that these data
sets are exhaustive, and are believed to cover all companies in their field of interest, as it is
compulsory for French firms to provide this information. The BRN database (Bénéfices Réels
Normaux) provides extensive accounting and fiscal data on operating profit, debt and equity
for any company with sales turnover above 530,000 euros. More than 500,000 companies
are included in the data set each year. The DADS database (Déclarations Annuelles de
Données Sociales) gives information on the labour structure (wages, qualifications), and covers
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more than 80% of employees. Financial Market data is provided by Euronext, for all listed
companies3 that were quoted during at least one year between 1994 and 2000.
The DADS data set is based on the plant level, from which we reconstitute the data at
the firm level. Firms keep the same ID number, called Siren, throughout their economic life,
allowing us to merge the BRN and DADS and to follow companies over the period of study.
Finally, the Euronext dataset tracks the traded securities of listed companies, each stock being
registered under a unique ID code, called Sicovam. For each traded security, we identify the
firm it represents and build the link between the Sicovam and the Siren identifiers. Whenever
several securities are related to the same firm, we only keep the most traded stock.
Our measure of workforce and employment is based on the average number of employees
over the year4. We thus avoid the important accounting bias induced by a measurement of
labour based exclusively on the end of the fiscal year. We then require that firms in our
sample have a workforce of at least 20 employees in 1995. Doing so, we eliminate small
companies for which the purpose of this study may be irrelevant. After filtering for influential
data5 and eliminating specific sectors6, the final sample, named general set of companies or
dataset A, has 62,798 observations, which have the same distribution over industrial sectors
as the complete BRN data set. Note that one observation corresponds to one firm for which
3We do not include foreign companies when they do not have a regular economic activity in France, and
do not exist in the DADS data set.
4Arithmetical average of the total number of employees at the end of each quarter, from the BRN. Note
that the aggregate measure of employment we obtain does not record a displacement of employees between
plants of the same firm as a decrease in workforce.
5We exclude observations corresponding to the first and last percentiles of economic and financial ratios.
6Companies from specific sectors, such as Agriculture, Energy, Real-Estate Property, Financial services,
Government, Associations, are put aside, as they either do not fit with the purpose of this study or with the
traditional accounting analysis.
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statistical information is available for at least one year between 1994 and 2000. Only one
fifth of these firms have available information for every year from 1994 to 2000, due to a high
rate of bankruptcies, creations and mergers7 Though most of them are already included in
dataset A, we also analyse publicly-listed companies in a separate database, called dataset B.
We include large French companies (quoted at the "Réglement Mensuel" and the "Marché au
comptant") and medium-sized companies with a good record in accounting practices and key
financial figures (quoted at the "Second Marché"). The final dataset records 417 observations
in our reference year (1996).
We focus on the change in workforce between 1995 and 1996, this being our key variable
used to distinguish between two groups of firms: employment downsizers and employment
upsizers. Our variable includes both full-time and part-time jobs. However, firms could
reclassify full-time positions into part-time positions, while our variable would fail to measure
a decrease in workforce. We first address this concern: the share of part-time jobs in the
total workforce actually decreased from 7.18% to 6.55% for employment upsizers and from
7.31% to 6.48% for employement downsizers. A Tukey’s Studentized Range Test indicates
that the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant at a 5% threshold.
More generally, firms are allowed to reduce the working time instead of cutting the workforce.
In such a case, our measure would be biased. We look at the change in the average number
of hours worked per worker between 1995 and 1996. Firms were not reducing the number of
hours instead of downsizing; On the contrary, in the case of listed companies the two working
policies were used jointly. A total of 43.15% of the firms report using a workforce reduction
7Among the 62,798 observations, some firms are only present at the very beginning of the period and then
disappear; other firms only appear after our reference year 1995-1996.
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between 1995 and 1996. This part is of 43.08% for the non listed companies and of 53.98% for
the listed companies. The intensity of the workforce reduction comparing the two sets of firms
is another interesting descriptive variable. Taking into considaration only firms with workforce
reduction, the proportion of strong reduction (more than 5%) averages 52.36% of non listed
companies while the proportion of weak reduction is 47.64%. Listed companies report less
strong reduction : 43.82%.
• The Profitability Ratios tell us whether a business is making profits - and if so whether
it is at an acceptable rate.
– Return on Assets: ROA = Net Profit before tax, interest and dividend (EBIT)Assets
– Return on Equity : ROE = Net Profit before tax, interest and dividend (EBIT) + Financial resultEquity + Long-term debt
• The Operating Ratios give us an insight into how efficiently the business is employing
those resources invested in fixed assets and working capital.
– Profit Margin: Pmarg = Net Profit before tax, interest and dividend (EBIT)Sales
– Labour Productivity : Lprod = Value addedTotal hours worked
– Labour Cost : Lcost = Wages + social contributionsTotal hours worked
• The Liquidity Ratios indicate how capable a business is of meeting its short-term obli-
gations as they fall due.
– Debt rate: Debt= Long-term debtEquity + long-term debt
– Long-term debt pressure: Lpres = Long-term debtTotal debt
– Interest Cover: Icov = InterestsSales
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• The Investment Ratio concentrates on the long-term health of a business.
– Investment effort: Effo = InvestmentsFixed assets
In addition, we include financial market information for publicly-listed companies, such
as the change in stock price and the change in capitalisation (computed in consecutive years).
Stock prices have been adjusted to take into account the change in the total number of shares8.
We also use labour information regarding workforce: namely gender, qualifications (divided
into four categories from the least qualified to the most qualified), age (four categories) and
the weight of part-time work in the total workforce.
Depending on their change in workforce in 1996, companies are then divided into employ-
ment downsizers and employment upsizers.
4 Econometric strategy
Our variable of interest is the economic performance induced by the downsizing policy. Let Y 1it
be one of our main economic indicators (for instance, the level of ROE in one year), where the
superscript stands for the treatment status (1 if a downsizing programme has been adopted in
1995-96, 0 otherwise), and the subscripts i and t identify respectively the firm and the time
period. Let T be a dummy variable with value Ti = 1 when the firm belongs to the group of
downsizers. At time t after 1996, the average treatment effect over the treated population is:
τ |trueT=1 = E(τi|Ti = 1) = E(Y 1it |Ti = 1)− E(Y 0it |Ti = 1)
The problem of unobservability is summarised by the fact that we can estimate E(Y 1it |Ti = 1),
but not E(Y 0it |Ti = 1). A natural way to cope with this problem is to use a Difference In
8Adjustment coefficients were provided by Euronext.
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Differences (DID) estimator, whenever panel data on firms both before and after the treatment
are available (at date t′ and t ):
τ |simpleT=1 = E(Y 1it − Y 1it′ |Ti = 1)− E(Y 0it − Y 0it′ |Ti = 0).
This DID estimator is the one usually used in the management literature. However, we argue
that this estimator is potentially biased when it does not include the characteristic of firms that
influences their participation. In the simple case where the treatment effect is homogenous
among participating firms, assume that Yit = g(Xi) + τTi + φi + it, where φi is a fixed
individual-specific effect and it a temporary individual-specific fixed effect. Whenever the
selection treatment is correlated with it the DID estimator is inconsistent and approximates
to
τ |simpleT=1 = τ |trueT=1 + E(it − it′ |Ti = 1)− E(it − it′ |Ti = 0)
This bias has been illustrated by the so-called Ashenfelter’s dip in the case of earnings gain
and training programmes. In our case, firms are more likely to adopt a downsizing treatment
in 1996 if a temporary dip in profitability occurs the year before (for instance, if Yit′ falls below
a threshold Y ). Then a faster growth in indicators such as ROE and ROA is expected among
those who downsize.
Our main contribution is first to consider observable variables that affect employment
policy, such as the initial structural characteristics of the firms (in the economic, financial,
labour and stock-market fields), and then to assess the importance of this temporary dip
between 1995 and 1996. Conditioning on a large set of observable covariatesX, we then assume
that the remaining unobservable variables affecting employment policy (T ) do not affect the
change in economic performance (Y ), and hence are not present in : Yi1, Yi0 ⊥ Ti|Xi,∀i.
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Intuitively, this assumes that conditioning on observable covariates, we can take assignment
to treatment as having been random. If we define
τi|correctedXi,Ti=1 = E(Y 1it − Y 1it′ |Xi, T = 1)− E(Y 0it − Y 0it′ |Xi, T = 0)
Then using the distribution of covariates X, an unbiased estimator of τ |trueT=1 is given by
τ |correctedT=1 = EXi
{
τi|correctedXi,Ti=1
}
We proceed in two steps. The first step consists in estimating a logit model explaining
the probability that a firm is involved in a workforce reduction, both for the publicly-listed
and non-listed companies. The logit model allows us to characterize the nature of the work-
force reduction. The second step estimates the specific effect of such a strategy upon different
performance indicators Y , using standard OLS9 where the change in economic performance
Yit − Yit′ is explained by the employment policy T and the set of variables X we included in
the logistic estimate. We then eliminate insignificant variables in an iterative procedure, using
a threshold of 10%, and we report the coefficient of T whenever the variable is significant.
The OLS estimation is equivalent to a controlled Difference In Differences estimator. We use
two different starting points for our estimates: 1995 and 1996, and we look for short-term
(1995-96), medium term (1996-97) and long term (1996-2000) paths of performance variables.
The short term differences are used to assess the dip in economic performance before the treat-
ment. The medium and long term differences give a gross measure of the treatment effect.
Finally, the net change in economic performance can be approximated as a difference between
9We have also used matching estimators, following the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); the propensity
score of downsizing is then computed by the logistic estimate. The results are very similar to the OLS estimates,
showing that we do not face a problem on heterogeneity or non-linearity. For a comparison of several evaluation
methods, cf. Duflo (2002).
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the gross change and the dip. Note that these estimates give the impact of employment policy
on the gap between downsizing firms and other firms for each variable of interest, rather than
on the level of these variables.
Our econometric strategy requires that labour, accounting and financial-market informa-
tion is available both before and after the year when the workforce reduction occurs10. That
is to say, we only keep firms that are still registered in the database from 1995 to 2000. Due
to a high rate of bankruptcy and turnover, only 13,615 companies from the general dataset
are used for both the logistic and OLS estimates, and 222 companies for the listed companies
dataset.
5 Determinants of Workforce Reduction Differ in Listed and
Non-Listed Companies
We run two different specifications for the logit model (Table 1). The first one includes a
complete set of characteristics of firms, as well as information on workers and on financial
markets (for the dataset B). Specifically, this estimate includes the size of the firm, different
accounting data (profitability ratios, operating ratios, liquidity ratios, investment ratioS),
labour characteristics (gender, qualification, age, weight of part-time work in the firm), and
sectorial dummies. However, a large number of control variables can generate biases. To tackle
this problem, the second estimate selects the more robust model. The procedure consists in
dropping the less significant variables one after another, using a threshold of 10%.
10We discuss at the end of section 5 the problems raised by missing data and bankrupted firms and how
this may affect our estimates.
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5.1 Reducing Workforce as a Defensive Strategy for the Non-Listed Com-
panies
We now focus on the results of the logit model for the general set of firms, using the second
specification (column 2 of Table 1 reports the coefficients estimated).
Firstly, it appears that the probability of a firm being involved in a workforce reduction
in 1996 increases with certain structural parameters, namely: 1/ the size of the firms (more
than 500 employees in 1995: 0.6355); 2/ The proportion of older workers (more than 50 years
old in 1995: 1.8823); 3/ The proportion of part-time workers in 1995 (0.2880). A large share
of part-time workers is indeed a signal that the firm is using insecure jobs. 4/ The high level
of the Herfindal index11 (hi_95 : 1.2167). Firms that were initially facing less competitive
pressure were possibly oversized and had to adjust their workforce in 1996.
Secondly, the workforce reduction is correlated with a financial structure on the verge of
bankruptcy. As expected, the probability of reducing the workforce is higher in companies
characterised by a low level of Return on Equity (ROE :-0.4696), an increase in long term
11We first compute a Herfindhal index for each of the 600 sectorial activities in which companies are classified.
For activity k, this index is computed as a ratio between the sum of squared sales done at the companies’ level,
and the square of the whole sales in this activity.
Hk =
∑
i (SALES
i
k)
2
(
∑
i SALES
i
k)
2
This index has a value between 1/Nk (where Nk is the number of companies in activity k) and 1. We then
compute a index of the average competite pressure the firm has to face for the markets she is implemented in,
as a weighted average of sectorial indexes Hk:
H
i =
∑
k
SALESik
SALESi
Hk where SALESi =
∑
k′
SALESik′
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debt pressure (Lpress: 0.2771) and an increase in insolvency (interest cover : 2.9983). Notice
that this insolvency increases despite the leverage effect entailed by a reduction of firms assets
(∆Assets_95 : -0.7519) in 1994-1995.
Thirdly, the cost of unskilled labour is not a significant predictor of workforce reductions.
This suggests that downsizing stems from factors outside the firms, on the demand-side, such
as the decline of sales (sales turnover : -1.2436). Hence, the employment reduction appears as
a flexible and defensive response to a fall in sales and profitability. This last result is similar to
one of the conclusions that Cappelli highlighted (2000: 21): "Excess capacity associated with
shortfalls in demand has been seen as a main cause of layoffs." Note that due to the gloomy
economic outlook, firms reduce employment in spite of a sustained productivity (d1_lpht =
0.2616). The rise in labour productivity is a necessary step before reducing workforce without
a disorganisation of the production. However, a higher cost of the highly qualified workers
decreases the probability of downsizing. Indeed, this variable acts as a dummy variable for the
firms making enough profits to share them with the top management. This means that firms
do not analyse the wages of highly qualified workers as a cost that should be reduced. Finally,
the logistic regression does not show that publicly-listed or group-owned companies have a
higher probability of reducing employment, which contradicts the hypothesis of shareholder-
driven downsizing. However, this issue has to be studied in a separate logit estimation on
publicly-listed firms.
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5.2 Reducing the Workforce as a Way for Listed Companies to Improve
their Financial Position
We now estimate the probability for a publicly-listed firm to be involved in a workforce reduc-
tion. The columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 display the results of a logit model that includes nearly
the same dependent variables as those used in the previous model. However, two exceptions
must be noted. Firstly, we exclude the variable group because all the publicly-listed companies
belong to a group. Secondly, we include stock market-based variables: the change in capitalisa-
tion, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s stock outperformed the CAC40 index 12,
and a dummy variable adjust which indicates whether the stock price has been adjusted by
the firm. Column 3 shows the estimate of the benchmark model while column 4 reports only
the variables that are significant (threshold of 10%).
The share price adjustment is negatively correlated with a workforce reduction (adjust_95:-
0.6365), as this variable may indicate important restructuring the year before, such as a merger
or an acquisition, which usually leads to a change in the number and price of shares. Work-
force reductions in 1996, primarily, are more likely to occur in firms whose competitiveness
is undermined by the high labour cost of unskilled workers (lchq1_95 : 1.7465 ). Both a low
share and low wages of highly skilled workers (q3_95 : -1.9903, lchq3_95 :-1.5967) indicate
that firms where profits before interest and taxes are too low to be shared among the managers
are more inclined to shed jobs.
12This index is made up of 40 shares, selected from the one hundred biggest companies listed on Euronext
Paris, measured in terms of market capitalisation. As the CAC40 is the benchmark for Euronext Paris, it is
widely used by portfolio managers to measure performance. In 1996, the CAC40 index fell by 9.09%. The
dummy variable is computed as 1(∆ Share Price > ∆ CAC40)
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Secondly, listed-companies are more likely to be involved in a workforce reduction when
they have to struggle in a more competitive sector (d1_Hi95=-0,3440), with an inadequate
skill structure. For example, a low proportion of skilled workers (q3_95 :-1.9903) at low cost
(lchq3_95:-1.5967) increases the probability of laying off.
Finally, workforce reduction seems to be a strategic response to a poor financial position,
rather than a poor economic one. Downsizers do face financial difficulties, such as a high level
of debt-pressure and a low ROE (respectively cper_tendt95 : 0.6978, ROE_95 : -4.7143). They
deal with a high level of debt by reducing their assets in 1994-1995 (d1_assets_95 :-1.7709).
However - and this is a major difference with the general set of firms - the demand side, as
measured by sales turnover, is not a significant predictor.
6 Estimating the Impact of a Workforce Reduction
In Tables 2, 3 and 4, we report the impact of a workforce reduction (dummy variable T), for
both the simple estimator (second column) and the corrected OLS estimator (third column).
Each row indicates a different regression, where one of the economic indicators (first column)
is explained by the dummy variable T for the simple estimator, and also a complete set of
control variables for the corrected estimator13.
For the general set of companies, workforce reduction improves labour productivity in
the long run, up by +2.21% according to the simple estimator, though the OLS estimator
gives a lower figure: only +1.21%. However, the net gain is a more accurate index because
it includes the contemporary effects of 1995-1996. Consequently, while the simple analysis
13the set of variables X we included is the same as those used in the logistic estimate. We then eliminate
insignificant variables in an iterative procedure, using a threshold of 10%.
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estimates the net gain of +2.21% between 1995 and 2000, most of the increase has vanished
according to OLS estimator (+0.16%). Furthermore, improved productivity does not imply
improved profitability, as the labour cost gap is significantly widened, though the increase is
small in magnitude (the labour cost gap between downsizing firms and other firms is +0.39%
or +0.50% higher in the short run).
Estimators provide very different results when it comes to the analysis of the financial position
of firms. Basically, the simple estimator exhibits, after 1996, a buoyant growth in profitabil-
ity (Return on Assets: +5.77 points, Return on Equity: +2.29 points in the long run) and
a heightened Profit Margin (+0.74 points). Positive effects of workforce reduction are long-
lasting: investment efforts increase (+2.72 points), meaning that firms become more confident
about future prospects. However, there is no significant change in the long-term debt pres-
sure or debt rate. Overall, the simple estimator would tip in favour of a successful offensive
downsizing, with a positive impact of cutbacks on financial figures both in the short and the
long run.
Conclusions drawn by the corrected estimator are definitely different. Between 1995 and 1996,
while there is no significant effect on profitability according to the simple estimator, the OLS
estimator gives the opposite picture, in which main financial indicators are strongly deterio-
rated, especially Return on Assets (-1.86 points) and Return on Equity (-1.87 points). Such a
downturn should be attributed to a fall in demand. Therefore, cutbacks are consistent with a
defensive model of downsizing. Once selection bias is corrected, most of the net gain in ROE
and Profit Margin vanishes, meaning that firms that make large layoffs are no longer those
that will have higher profitability growth.
Yet over the whole period studied from 1995 to 2000, the change in the ROA gap between the
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two groups of firms is significant, with a net increase of 1.87 points. Such a net gain is not con-
sistent with defensive downsizing, and calls for further investigation into the changes in assets
and sales. Firstly, both the simple and corrected estimators indicate that the gap in assets
increases over the long run, showing that downsizing firms follow a different pattern of asset
capitalisation. One may have in mind a so-called "asset-light" strategy, which calls for the
company to slow down its investments. Secondly, the gap in assets widens by more than the
gap in sales (simple estimator: -8.57% vs -4.55%, OLS estimator: -5.26% vs -3.06%). Hence,
employment downsizers managed to increase their average amount of sales per unit of capital
more than employment upsizers. This gain in productive efficiency, three times smaller with
the OLS estimator than with the simple estimator, is at the core of a net long-run increase in
ROA.
For listed companies, the main result is that workforce reduction has no effect on future eco-
nomic performance (ROE and ROA). However, the heightened labour productivity exhibited
by the simple and OLS estimators exhibit, continues its ascending trend in 1997 and 2000
(respectively: +12.37% and +14,53%, OLS estimators), while labour costs grow more slowly
(+9.14% in 1996-2000). This gap suggests that some profitability gains exist but they are not
yet transformed into an increase in ROE. Finally, the changes in the structure of qualifications
suggest that firms are always involved in restructuring processes, which does not allow us to
draw significant and positive results, possibly because of a high variance in the results of our
sample.
The results for listed companies can be compared to those found in Wayhan and Werner
(2000) for a set of the 250 largest U.S. corporations. Basing their estimates on the changes
in capitalisation and sales, the authors insist that the pressure stockholders place on listed
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firms is a cause for downsizing. In our database, according to the logistic estimate, listed firms
that downsized are also characterised by a low return on equity. However, their stocks did not
significantly under-perform in the year previous to the workforce reduction. Finding a positive
but fragile impact of workforce reduction on financial performance in the short run, Wayhan
and Werner argue that workforce reduction could lead to a lower cost structure, which is
leveraged into a competitive advantage by the firm’s management. On the contrary, our OLS
estimates show an increase in labour cost and consequently no positive change in profitability.
So far, our corrected estimates are based on firms for which data is available until 2000. One
question arises about the meaning of missing data points: of the companies that were present
in our general data set in 1995 with at least 20 employees, 5.89% are missing in 1997 and
13.41% in 2000. Firstly, we test the logical relationship between disappearing from dataset
A, and the initial characteristics of companies (Table 5). As expected, a higher probability
of being absent is linked with poor financial performances, such as a low level of return on
equity and a decreasing profit margin. Poor profitability combined with a gloomy outlook
have driven these firms into financial distress and bankruptcy. Listed companies included in
dataset A are less likely to be driven into bankruptcy, which is consistent with our results in
section 4. Note that firms belonging to a group are more likely to disappear from the dataset.
This might indicate that these firms have merged with other entities within the group. In this
case, we cannot easily assess the bias that might be generated on our previous estimates, as
these firms could be in either good or bad financial shape.
We thus leave aside the discussion of mergers and focus on the more severe problem of
bankruptcy for missing firms that do not belong to a group. As firms that reduced their
employment are twice as likely to face bankruptcy, according to our data, our previous OLS
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estimates based on surviving firms may be upward biased14. Therefore, for the three key
profitability ratios (ROA, ROE and Profit Margin), we estimate a lower-bound for the impact
of workforce reduction by including reconstructed data that were previously missing. That
is, where some data are missing we input values that firms would have been likely to exhibit
if they had survived15. Then we run OLS estimates on the corrected dataset. The results
provide some reassurance that these measurement concerns do not have a serious impact on
our results. As in our previous estimate, there is still a positive net gain in ROA and Profit
Margin between 1995 and 2000, though it is lower (ROA: +1.02 points, Profit margin: +0.02
points). While the net change in ROE was previously insignificant, corrected estimates show
that the profitability gap is now worse in the long run, but by only 2.3 points.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides the first comparison of the relationship between workforce reduction and
firms’ performances in listed and non-listed companies. It gives evidence that the nature of
performance deterioration that triggered workforce reduction differs between the two groups
of firms. A first group is dealing with financial distress, while the second is struggling with
a poor economic position, close to bankruptcy, and uses workforce reductions as a defensive
response to a fall in sales. Moreover, downsizing is a decision taken at different stages in the
performance downturn by different firms. The reason may lie in the structure of governance.
14We can also argue that given initial characteristics, a downsizing policy may reduce the occurrence of
bankruptcy, a positive effect not included in our previous OLS estimates. Future research could address this
question, looking at a survival model.
15As we are interested in a lower-bound estimate, when data is missing we input the two first percentiles of
the observed distribution.
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Listed firms, urged by shareholders, downsize before approaching bankruptcy. Defensive lay-
offs are purported to improve the financial position before it becomes severe. On the contrary,
other firms employ layoffs as the last-resort strategy to avoid bankruptcy. This result gives
evidence of defensive downsizing, rather than the offensive strategy presented in the manage-
ment literature. Moreover, in the general set of firms, downsizing is not shareholder-driven.
Secondly, if we do not correct for selection bias, our results reach the same conclusion as the
management research: a positive effect of downsizing on firms’ performances. Thirdly, after
correcting for selection bias, our estimates do not support the management thesis. According
to the corrected Difference in Differences estimates, for the general set of firms, the productive
efficiency (ROA) is increased, but only at a slow rate: +1.8% between 1995- 2000. It is three
times smaller than with the simple estimate. The reason derives from a higher increase in the
sales per unit of capital among employment downsizers, than among employment upsizers.
Finally, the paper provides evidence that for both groups -listed and non-listed companies-
downsizing policy does not sustain financial performance (ROE). For non-listed companies,
the reason stems from the priority given to the economic ratios over the financial ones. Fur-
ther research should explain why the listed companies do not improve their financial ratio,
although it is a priority in their strategic plan. An important caveat needs to be made about
our findings, as we do not control for unobservable variables. While the OLS method analyses
the causal impact of exogenous "treatment", we focus on an endogenous decision chosen by
the firms themselves (reducing or not reducing the workforce). A possible avenue of future
research would be instrumental variable estimation, especially in the case of listed compa-
nies where shareholder structure may be a variable that does affect downsizing probability,
without directly affecting the future path of performance variables. In the same spirit as
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Ahmadjian and Robinson’s work (2001) on Japan, further research should also examine the
spread of downsizing, focusing on economic and institutional pressures on firms. It would give
an institutional dimension to the downsizing policies.
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Table 1: Logistic estimate of the probability to reduce workforce
exogenous variables dataset A dataset A dataset B dataset B
speciﬁcation 1 speciﬁcation 2 speciﬁcation 1 speciﬁcation 2
Intercept -0.7327 0.2703 8.9351 2.1892
WORKFORCE STRUCTURE
Size
50-199 employees (95) 0.3918** 0.3799** 1.5455* -
200-499 employees (95) 0.6178** 0.5908** 1.2230 -
more than 500 employees (95) 0.6734** 0.6355** 1.2519 -
Age
proportion of 25-35 years old (95) (A2) -0.0889 - -0.8171 -
proportion of 35-50 years old (95) (A3) 0.7635** 0.8506** 3.0646 -
proportion of more than 50 years old (95) (A4) 1.7458** 1.8823** 0.8146 -
Gender
proportion of female workers (95) (S2) 0.0528 - 0.2378 -
Qualiﬁcations
Share of unskilled workers (95) (Q1) -1.4987** -1.5572** -12.5583 -
Share of skilled workers (95) (Q2) -1.5655** -1.6428** -13.2582 -
Share of highly skilled workers (95) (Q3) -1.4988** -1.5273** -15.3589 -1.9903**
Share of part-time job (95) (PT) 0.3464* 0.2880* 6.1533* .
∆PT (94-95) -0.2254 - -1.6820 -
Labour Costs
Unskilled workers’ wage (log) (LCHQ1) (95) 0.0968 - 2.0075* 1.7465**
∆LCHQ1 (94-95) 0.00246 - -0.5510 -
Skilled workers’ wage (log) (LCHQ2) (95) 0.1304 - 0.5034 -
∆LCHQ2 (94-95) -0.1122 - 1.5587 -
Highly skilled workers’ wage (log) (LCHQ3) (94-95) 0.00728 - -1.8310* -1.5967**
∆LCHQ3 (94-95) -0.1802* -0.2107** 0.3022 -
PAST PERFORMANCES
Proﬁtability
Return on Equity (ROE) (95) -0.2143** -0.4696** -4.2160** -4.7143**
∆ROE (94-95) 0.1828 - 0.5868 -
Efﬁciency
Change in Proﬁt Margin (Pmarg) (94-95) -1.3259** -1.2583** -3.6016 -
Change in Labour Productivity (∆LPROD) (94-95) 0.2881** 0.2616** 1.1916** 0.6628*
Liquidity ratios
Interest Cover (ICOVER) (95) 2.3374 2.9983* -0.9160 -
∆ICOVER (94-95) 3.6265 - -0.3440 -
Debt rate (DRATE) (95) 0.0246 - 0.8829** 0.6978**
∆DRATE (94-95) 0.0115 - -0.4677 -
Long-Term Debt Pressure (LPRES) (95) 0.0553 - 1.2558 -
∆LPRES (94-95) 0.2590 0.2771* -1.9772 -
Sales turnover
∆LCA (94-95) -0.9748** -0.9729** -0.6064 -
Investment and assets
Change in Investment Effort (∆ EFFO) (94-95) 0.0293 - 1.4939 -
Change in Assets (∆ Assets) (94-95) -0.7641** -0.7519** -2.6843** -1.7709*
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
Listed Company (Listed) 0.1337 - N N
Group (95) -0.0667 - N N
Competitive Pressure (HI) (95) 1.1599** 1.2167** -0.3258 -
∆HI (95) 0.00102 - -0.3091 -0.3440*
FINANCIAL MARKET VARIABLES
Change in Capitalization (∆Capi)(94-95) N N 0.1569 -
Return on stocks / CAC40 N N 0.3490 -
Restructuralization (95) N N -1.2587** -0.6365*
Percent Concordant 64.6% 64.4% 81.5% 74%
number of observations 13615 13615 222 222
Sources: BRN, DADS, Euronext. Coefﬁcients with a * are signiﬁcant with a threshold of 10%; coefﬁcients with a ** are signiﬁcant with
a threshold of 5%. N stands for variables that were not included because they are no longer relevant for the dataset considered. Sectorial
variables are included in speciﬁcation 1 and, whenever they are signiﬁcant at a 10% threshold, in speciﬁcation 2. Other explanatory
variables included in speciﬁcation 1 which are not signiﬁcant are: past change in workforce structure (Dataset A and B: ∆Q1,∆Q2,∆Q3),
three dummy variables for the market of quotation (Dataset B only: Réglement Mensuel, Marché au comptant, Second Marché).
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Table 2: Estimated Impact of Workforce Reduction. Short-term Analysis (1995-1996)
Variablesa Dataset A Dataset B
SHORT-TERM
DIFFERENCES
(1995-1996) Simple DID Corrected OLS Simple DID Corrected OLS
PROFITABILITY RATIOS
Return on assets
∆ROA NS -0,01867** NS NS
(0,00465)
Return on Equity
∆ROE NS -0,01874** NS NS
(0,00405)
OPERATING RATIOS
proﬁt margin
∆PMARG NS -0,00285** NS NS
(0,00069)
labour productivity
∆LPROD (log) NS -0,01047** NS NS
(0,00379)
labour costs
∆LCOST (total) (log) 0,00390** 0,00502** NS NS
(0,00150) (0,00143)
∆LCOST Q1 (log) NS NS NS NS
∆LCOST Q2 (log) NS 0,00292* NS NS
(0,00169)
∆LCOST Q3 (log) NS NS 0,03759* NS
(0,02134)
LIQUIDITY RATIOS
Long-term debt pressure
∆LPRES -0,00349* NS NS NS
(0,00211)
Debt rate
∆DEBT NS -0,05789** NS NS
(0,01366)
INVESTMENT EFFORT
∆EFFO -0,01880** -0,02784** NS NS
(0,00249) (0,00194)
SALES, ASSETS AND EQUITY
Sales
∆Lsales -0,08118** -0,07974** -0,26673** NS
(0,00309) (0,00305) (0,09723)
Assets
∆Lassets -0,04898** -0,03739** NS NS
(0,00288) (0,00286)
EMPLOYMENT
Workforce level
∆LABOUR (log) -0,19416** -0,18840** -0,20499** -0,16979**
(0,00273) (0,00275) (0,02955) (0,03052)
Qualiﬁcations
∆Q1 -0,00482** -0,00456** NS NS
(0,00123) (0,00122)
∆Q2 0,00227* NS NS NS
(0,00130)
∆Q3 0,00343** 0,00397** NS NS
(0,00091) (0,00089)
astandard deviation are given in brackets; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10. NS stands for Non-signiﬁcant at a 10% threshold. Endogenous
variables are given in the ﬁrst column. Each row corresponds to a speciﬁc regression, where the economic indicator (say, change in ROE between 1995
and 1996) is explained by the dummy variable T of the employment policy (simple DID estimator) and control variables (corrected OLS estimator).
Only the coefﬁcient of the dummy variable T is reported, if signiﬁcant.
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Table 3: Estimated Impact of Workforce Reduction. Medium-term Analysis (1996-1997)
Variablesa Dataset A Dataset B
MEDIUM-TERM
DIFFERENCES
(1996-1997) Simple DID Corrected OLS Simple DID Corrected OLS
PROFITABILITY RATIOS
Return on assets
∆ROA 0,02639** 0,01906** 0,03736* NS*
(0,00458) (0,00460) (0,02125)
Return on Equity
∆ROE 0,02541** 0,01747** NS NS
(0,00449) (0,00449)
OPERATING RATIOS
proﬁt margin
∆PMARG 0,00413** 0,00300** NS NS
(0.00074) (0.00074)
labour productivity
∆LPROD (log) 0,01267** 0,00918** 0,12117* 0,12374*
(0.00426) (0,00433) (0,07191) (0,07228)
labour costs
∆LCOST (total) (log) NS NS NS NS
∆LCOST Q1 (log) NS NS 0,04962* 0,05726**
(0,02523) (0,02422)
∆LCOST Q2 (log) NS NS NS NS
∆LCOST Q3 (log) NS NS NS NS
LIQUIDITY RATIOS
Long-term debt pressure
∆LPRES -0,00808** -0,00636** -0,03846* NS
(0.00196) (0,00196) (0,02106)
Debt rate
∆DEBT 0,04416** 0,03138** NS NS
(0,01372) (0,01382)
INVESTMENT EFFORT
∆EFFO 0,01646** 0,01394** NS NS
(0,00241) (0,00242)
SALES, ASSETS AND EQUITY
Sales
∆Lsales (log) -0,02629** -0,02255** NS NS
(0,00311) (0,00315)
Assets
∆Lassets (log) -0,02964** -0,02112** -0,04595** NS
(0,00306) (0,00308) (0,02103)
EMPLOYMENT
Workforce level
∆LABOUR (log) NS 0,00692* NS NS
(0,00399)
Qualiﬁcations
∆Q1 NS NS NS NS
∆Q2 NS NS NS NS
∆Q3 NS NS 0,02733* NS
(0,01096)
astandard deviation are given in brackets; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10 NS stands for Non-signiﬁcant at a 10% threshold. Endogenous
variables are given in the ﬁrst column. Each row corresponds to a speciﬁc regression, where the economic indicator (say, change in ROE between 1996
and 1997) is explained by the dummy variable T of the employment policy (simple DID estimator) and control variables (corrected OLS estimator).
Only the coefﬁcient of the dummy variable T is reported, if signiﬁcant.
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Table 4: Estimated Impact of Workforce Reduction. Long-term Analysis (1996-2000)
Variablesa Dataset A Dataset B
LONG-TERM
DIFFERENCES
(1996-2000) Simple DID Corrected OLS Simple DID Corrected OLS
PROFITABILITY RATIOS
Return on assets
∆ROA 0,05775** 0,03741** NS NS
(0,00690) (0,00686)
Return on Equity
∆ROE 0,02299** 0,01726** NS NS
(0,00795) (0,00794)
OPERATING RATIOS
proﬁt margin
∆PMARG 0,00744** 0,00469** NS NS
(0,00109) (0,00109)
labour productivity
∆LPROD (log) 0,022060** 0,01212** 0,15300* 0,14532*
(0,00597) (0,00604) (0,07654) (0,07566)
labour costs
∆LCOST (total) (log) -0,00395* NS NS 0,09152*
(0,00229) (0,04559)
∆LCOST Q1 (log) NS NS NS NS
∆LCOST Q2 (log) -0,00638** NS 0,03912* NS
(0,00246) (0,02093)
∆LCOST Q3 (log) NS NS NS NS
LIQUIDITY RATIOS
Long-term debt pressure
∆LPRES NS NS -0,08874** NS
(0,04288)
Debt rate
∆DEBT NS NS NS NS
INVESTMENT EFFORT
∆EFFO 0,02724** 0,02160** NS NS
(0,00267) (0,00270)
SALES, ASSETS AND EQUITY
Sales
∆Lsales (log) -0,04555** -0,03062** NS NS
(0,00620) (0,00620)
Assets
∆Lassets (log) -0,08575** -0,05264** -0,12236* NS
(0,00675) (0,00666) (0,07064)
EMPLOYMENT
Workforce level
∆LABOUR (log) -0,02982** NS -0,16410* NS
(0,00940) (0,09087)
Qualiﬁcations
∆Q1 NS NS NS -0,02933
(0,01611)
∆Q2 NS -0,00494** NS NS
(0,00236)
∆Q3 NS NS 0,05050** 0,05396**
(0,02248) (0,02187)
astandard deviation are given in brackets; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10. NS stands for Non-signiﬁcant at a 10% threshold. Endogenous
variables are given in the ﬁrst column. Each row corresponds to a speciﬁc regression, where the economic indicator (say, change in ROE between 1996
and 2000) is explained by the dummy variable T of the employment policy (simple DID estimator) and control variables (corrected OLS estimator).
Only the coefﬁcient of the dummy variable T is reported, if signiﬁcant.
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Table 5: Logistic Estimate of the Probability of Missing Companies
exogenous variables Prob of being missing Prob of being missing
in 1997 in 2000
Intercept 0.1685 1.1449**
WORKFORCE STRUCTURE
Size
50-199 employees (95) 0.2162** 0.1119**
200-499 employees (95) 0.4493** -
Age
proportion of 25-35 years old (95) (A2) 2.2779** 1.3278**
proportion of 35-50 years old (95) (A3) 2.9864** 1.4266**
proportion of more than 50 years old (95) (A4) 2.5158** 1.3711**
qualiﬁcations
Share of skilled workers (95) (Q2) 0.9122** 0.3321**
Share of highly skilled workers (95) (Q3) 1.3856** 0.5826**
Share of part-time job (95) (PT) 0.9644** 0.5341**
LABOUR COSTS
Change in hourly rate of unskilled workers (log) (∆LCHQ1) (94-95) - 0.1429*
Change in hourly rate of skilled workers (log) (∆LCHQ2) (94-95) 0.5998** -
Hourly rate of highly skilled workers (log) (LCHQ3) (95) -0.8841** -0.7043**
Change in hourly rate of highly skilled workers (log) (∆LCHQ3) (94-95) -0.6300** -
PAST PERFORMANCES
Proﬁtability
Return on Equity (ROE) (95) -0.7500** -0.4858**
Operating ratios
Change in Proﬁt Margin (∆Pmargin) (94-95) -2.3798** -1.7061**
Liquidity ratios
Interest Cover (ICOVER) (95) 11.7653** 10.3533**
Debt Rate (95) 0.1883** 0.1283**
Long-Term Debt Pressure (LPRES) (95) -0.5608** -0.4716**
Change in Long-Term Debt Pressure (∆LPRES) (94-95) 0.7754** 0.6840**
Investment and assets
Investment effort (EFFO) (95) -0.4580** -0.2650**
Change in assets (∆ASSETS) (LOG) (94-95) -0.4737** -0.2938**
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
Listed on a Stock Market (LISTED) (95) N -1.6246**
Group (95) 0.3158** 0.4514**
Percent concordant 83.9% 70.2%
Sources: BRN, DADS, Euronext. Endogenous variable: being missing in the year of reference (Y=1) or not (Y=0). Coefﬁcients with a
* are signiﬁcant with a threshold of 10%; coefﬁcients with a ** are signiﬁcant with a threshold of 5%. N stands for variables that were
not included because they are no longer relevant for the dataset considered. Sectorial variables are included in both estimations.
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